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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this document is to introduce non-specialists to the discipline and 
practice of public policy, particularly in relation to the construction sector in Australia. 
In order to do this, a brief overview of Australia’s government structure, and some of 
the main approaches to public policy analysis are outlined. Reference to construction 
related examples are provided to ensure issues discussed are relevant and 
understandable to construction professionals.  
Government is a significant player in the construction industry, and has multiple roles: 
adjudicator, regulator, constructor, purchaser and client of construction projects. 
Moreover there are many spheres of government that are typically engaged in 
construction projects at multiple stages.  
The machinery of government can be difficult to understand, even for long term 
public servants. Demystifying the processes within government can help to improve 
communication and therefore performance in the industry. A better understanding of 
how policy-making and government policies affect the construction industry will 
enhance communication and assist construction professionals and academics to 
understand and work with government. Additionally the document will provide an 
opportunity to demonstrate the relevance of policy analysis to inquiries of 
construction policies and regulation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The purpose of this report is to provide an introduction to public policy for those who 
are not familiar with this area of professional practice and research inquiry. The target 
audience is therefore construction professionals and researchers who do not have a 
background in government policy and, who wish to have a clearer idea of 
government policy formulation, development and implementation.  
The construction industry is a large and significant sector of the Australian economy. 
The total production of the building and construction industry in Australia in 2001-
2002 was $59.7 billion, accounting for 5.5% of GDP and 7.5% of employment (Cole 
2003). In Australia, there is a high level of government-initiated construction projects, 
approaching 30-40% of total industry turnover in the commercial building and 
engineering sectors. The public sector is thereby in a position to strongly influence 
the market due to its procurement policy for capital works and its role as regulator of 
the construction industry (Hampson and Brandon 2004). Adam Smith argued that 
apart from defending the citizens of a state and upholding justice, the key role of a 
state was “erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works 
which, though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great society, 
are, however, of such a nature that the profit could never repay the expense to any 
… number of individuals.” (1971: 210 – 211).Consequently, construction is a crucial 
policy arena. 
Historically, this role of designer, principal and project manager was undertaken in-
house by public works departments, but in some jurisdictions, this function has been 
devolved to other government agencies some of which may have little or no 
experience in construction (APCC 2002). Overall, the influence government has upon 
industry has been at multiple levels (Gann and Salter 2000) and the different arenas 
of influence are outlined in the figure below. 
 
Figure 1 - Gann and Salter 2000: 960 
As this diagram suggests, regulations affect all aspects of the construction industry – 
from materials, firms and construction projects themselves. Government regulation is 
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typically viewed as impacting negatively upon innovation and entrepreneurship in all 
sectors of industry. Consequently, “reducing red tape” and regulatory inconsistencies 
is perceived as a desirable outcome (OECD 1997). The direct costs normally 
associated with regulatory regimes are compliance costs and direct charges. 
However, in a fragmented system, such as Australia, indirect costs can also occur 
including procedural delays, either by government, or by industry having to adapt 
documentation for different spheres of government; lack of predictable outcomes, 
with variations occurring between spheres of government and sometimes within the 
same government agency; and lost business opportunities, with delays and red tape 
preventing realisation of business opportunities (OECD 1997). Research conducted 
internationally has shown that lack of coordination of policy, legislation and regulation 
between governments can lead to reduced innovation and productivity in industries 
(OECD 2001).  
Recently released research reports into the construction industry in Australia have 
likewise argued that improved consistency in the regulatory environment could lead 
to improvements in innovation (Manley 2004, Price Waterhouse Coopers 2002), 
improved productivity (Productivity Commission 2004), and that research into this 
area should be given high priority (Hampson & Brandon 2004). Productivity gains 
from an improved regulatory system have been estimated in the hundreds of millions 
of dollars (ABCB 2003).  
This report outlines the current Australian federal system of government, and 
discusses the policy making and approaches to policy cohesion currently in place. 
Five areas in which achieving increased coordination of legislation could have a 
positive impact on the Construction industry are suggested.  
2. UNDERSTANDING AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS  
Under the Constitution the Australian states joined together to form one indissoluble 
Commonwealth – a federation of states. A federation is a form of government in 
which power is divided between national governments and smaller regional 
governments, often referred to as states. This is an arrangement which  combines 
“strong constituent units of government, each possessing powers delegated to it by 
the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens 
in the exercise of its legislative, administrative and taxing powers, and each directly 
elected and accountable to its citizens” (Watts 2001: 24 – 26).  
A federation should be distinguished from a confederation which is a union of 
independent states which retain their independence, and a unitary form of 
government, which has a strong central government, and regions established for 
administrative convenience. In federations the federal and regional governments are 
both independent and coordinated (Wheare 1963). It has been argued that “The 
jurisdictional contours of a federation rarely make political sense, conform to a 
rational or organisational logic, or are economically advantageous. They simply exist 
as an ongoing set of inherited but continually adapting practices and provision” 
(O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna & Weller 1999:98). In this sense federations are 
instrumental arrangements which are designed to help make fragmented or disparate 
government entities work, adapting, adjusting and consolidating to deliver mutual 
benefits for all participating governments (O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna & Weller 1999: 
100). 
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Under a federal system, powers are divided between a central government and 
several regional governments. In Australia, power was divided between the 
Commonwealth Government and the governments of the six colonies, which were 
renamed 'states' by the Constitution. Specific areas of legislative power ("heads of 
power") were given to the Commonwealth Government, including:  
• taxation  
• defence  
• foreign affairs  
• postal and telecommunications services (Australian Government 2005) 
• The Commonwealth also has power to make laws for Australia's territories. 1 
The states retained legislative power over all other matters that occurred within their 
borders, including:  
• police  
• hospitals  
• education  
• public transport (Australian Government 2005). 
 
Mutuality, reciprocity and exchange are concepts which reinforce the concept of 
federalism which Chapman (1989: 57) argues no crisis has yet been able to change. 
Nevertheless there has been considerable tension between the various spheres of 
government, as the wording of the Constitution has often created situations where 
both the Commonwealth and the States claim the authority to make laws over the 
same matter. (Australian Government, 2005).  
A myriad of committees and working parties are needed to achieve cooperation 
between the levels of government, particularly in relation to policy. The main trend in 
cooperative federalism is increasing centralism and growing power of the 
Commonwealth at the expense of the states (O’Faircheallaigh et al, 1999). Part of the 
reason for this is the desire for national coherence in a range of policy areas. 
However, the High Court of Australia has also made a number of judgements which 
have increased the power of the Commonwealth at the expense of the states on a 
range of issues, which has been further enhanced by the increased revenue from the 
GST (Fenna 2004: 172). In particular the Roads Case of 1926, the High Court found 
that the Commonwealth could attach conditions to the granting of money, no matter 
how invasive these might be for the states (Fenna 2004). Further, the federated 
structure of government means that policy formulation and implementation is a 
complex set of interrelated actions between actors: 
In federations multiple governments fragment policy processes and 
contribute a further set of complications or opportunities for public 
sector management. Policy must be negotiated between and across 
different levels of government, vertically between Commonwealth, 
state and local governments, and horizontally between states or 
local authorities. (O’Faircheallaigh, Wanna & Weller 1999:97).  
                                            
1 A complete list of Commonwealth heads of power is at section 51 of the Constitution. 
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2.1 Intergovernmental Relationships 
Policy analysts who examine intergovernmental relationships have tended to focus 
on hierarchical models of relationships between governments (Chapman 1989:61). 
This is not the only model, or way of seeing, federal government arrangements, 
however. A useful set of models have been advanced in the academic literature 
which are outlined below. The circle in each model indicates the area of responsibility 
of each sphere of government. All the figures are based on those initially developed 
by Wright (1978: 20).  
Model 1 can be described as a separated authority model, 
with sharp distinct boundaries between the national and 
state governments (Wright 1978). Under this model, both 
state and commonwealth govern within their sphere of 
authority. This may have been the intention of the framers of the 
Australian constitution, which sought to differentiate the roles 
and powers of state and federal governments. This model has 
been strongly undermined in recent years, as it can be 
challenged in areas where there is overlapping authority. Under 
this perspective, local governments are seen as “creatures of 
the state subject to creation and abolition at the unfettered 
discretion of the state (barring constitutional limitations) … 
localities are mere tenants at the will of the legislature” Wright 
(1978: 21). In those areas were there are distinct and discrete 
spheres of authority, this model of viewing federal systems of 
governments may have value, although the perspective assumed in this model on the 
role of local governments is not one likely to be welcomed by local governments 
themselves.  
Model 2 is an overlapping authority model, where there is a 
balanced set of negotiated actions between the three 
spheres of government (Wright 1978). Each has autonomou
spheres of action, however, most of the policy environment 
involves simultaneous action by multiple policy actors from 
multiple spheres of government all at the same time, and 
the power and influence of any one sphere is somewhat 
limited, due to the existence of the other spheres. This may 
be a more appropriate model of seeing federations as it 
acknowledges the “increasing interdependence of, and 
interaction between, policy making process in a political 
system characterised not only by a very high degree of 
horizontal (functional) differentiation and specialisation, but 
also by the institutional separation of vertical levels of 
federal, state and local governments” (Scharpf, 1978 cited in Chapman 1989:62). 
Under this view, local governments are seen as valid players with distinct and related 
roles to both state and national governments. In practice this view leads to a set of 
intergovernmental relationships that could best be 
s 
described as bargaining, or 
negotiated between all three spheres of government.   
Figure 3 - Model #2 -
Overlapping authority model
- (based on Wright 1978) 
Figure 2 - Model #1 -
Separated Authority Model -
(based on Wright 1978). 
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Model 3 is an inclusive authority model with diminishing circles of 
power and responsibility for each level of government (Wright 
1978). If a government wanted to expand its area of influence, 
then either it can expand its own circle, or diminish the circle(s) of 
other government(s). Where a national government enacts 
legislation aimed at overriding state legislation, then the national 
government has effectively gained power, at the expense of the 
state governments, which have lost power. An alternative is to 
increase the size of the circle, without necessarily diminishing the 
size of the other spheres of government. This happens when the 
national government successfully raises more money and gives 
this to the states in the form of tied grants that place conditions on 
the states if they accept the grants. While these conditions could 
be seen as losses, the gains are often perceived to outweigh the 
losses and every sphere of government can achieve ‘wins’ over all.   
So which model best describes the situation in Australia at the moment? Federal 
systems of government can be viewed in a variety of ways. Parkin (2003) argues a 
situation close to the first model in that there are distinct areas of involvement for the 
different spheres of government, with state governments seen as essentially 
governments of provision, whereas the commonwealth government is primarily that 
of decision making and finance. Alternatively, the debates over Industrial Relations 
regulation and the situation of increasing reliance by the states on federal funding, 
leads some commentators to argue the current situation is closer to the third model, 
with the Commonwealth seeking to expand its influence at the expense of the states 
(Hamill 2005).  
While arguments could be put for all of the models described above, we would argue 
that the overlapping model best describes the policy situation affecting construction in 
Australia. While the first and last model could be argued to exist for specific policy 
areas, the second model would appear to be the best at depicting the current policy 
in the Australian federal system at the moment particularly as construction is an area 
in which overlapping jurisdiction is apparent. This fragmentation has obvious issues 
for attempts to achieve consistency between jurisdictions particular where there is 
overlapping regulations. 2  
2.2 Cost of overlap in regulations  
The design and construction market as a whole is valued at over $40 billion per 
annum nationally (ACBR 2003). Over half of this building work is conducted across 
state borders. The lack of coordination between Commonwealth and State 
governments on construction regulations and policies is argued to negatively impact 
innovation (Manley 2004) and productivity (Productivity Commission 2004) in 
Australia. There is both quantitative and qualitative evidence that the Commonwealth 
is increasing the amount of regulation in all areas, with the Industry Commission 
reporting that the number of pages of legislation passed is doubling approximately 
every ten years (Fenna 2004: 99). Thus the lack of coordination between spheres of 
                                            
2 For a more detailed outline of the regulations affecting the construction industry in Australia, please see 
“Mapping the Regulatory Environment: An analysis of legislation affecting the construction industry in 
Australia.  
Figure 4 - Model #3 -
Inclusive Authority
Model - (based on Wright
1978) 
government, and the consequent deleterious affects on productivity and innovation in 
the sector have been well documented. The lack of coherency between local 
governments on processes such as development assessment (Productivity 
Commission 2004) is also seen to negatively impact upon the productivity of the 
industry.  
Manseau and Seaden (2001) argue that in countries with a strong centralised 
government structure, such as the United Kingdom and Finland, a single government 
department is able to champion innovation in industries such as construction. 
However, in countries with a federal system of government, like USA, Germany or 
Australia, there are a variety of agencies all dealing with aspects of a given industry, 
with resulting overlapping regulations (Manseau & Seaden 2001:17). In countries 
with centralised governments, government policy and actions are often seen as 
leading and promoting innovation.  In contrast, in countries with federal government 
structures, innovation is assumed to occur due to opportunities created by 
competitive forces in the marketplace without the intervention of government, with the 
public sector often viewed as being conservative and as building barriers to 
innovation (Manseau & Seaden 2001:17). PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2002) argue in 
contrast that government can enhance innovation as a client, as a regulator, as an 
educator, and as a custodian of the business environment.  
Geiger and Hoffman (1998) have noted that the extent of regulation in an industry 
tends to be negatively associated with firm performance. The cost of complying with 
variations in regulations between the states has been estimated by the Building 
Product Innovation Council (2003) as being up to $600 million per annum for the 
building product manufacturers alone. Industry in Australia has consistently held that 
regulations inhibit innovation (Manley 2004). However, recent years have seen a 
strong deregulation of industry in general (Banks 2005). Further, government 
regulation has been perceived as enablers of innovation (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
2002).  
The research in this area raises questions therefore as to how Australian 
governments can develop policies that enhance innovation in the industry, with one 
of the key areas noted is the reduction in red tape and increasing consistency across 
the different spheres of government. There are various means of achieving 
consistency in federal systems of government that are examined in the next section.  
2.3 Mechanisms for achieving coordination in federal systems of 
government 
Harmonisation offers that the differences in laws and policies between two 
jurisdictions should be reduced by adopting similar laws and policies (Leebron 1997). 
Harmonisation can be in the form of specific regulations – both inputs and outputs; it 
can facilitate more general policy objectives focussing on guidelines (eg. Goals for 
pollution); there can be agreement on certain principles; and lastly, harmonisation of 
structures or procedures, usually to reinforce other types of harmonisation. 
Harmonisation is only possible if states can converge around one commonly agreed 
standard (Fox 1992).  
Majone (1998) argues that within harmonisation, or coordination, there are a number 
of different levels. Optional harmonisation aims to guarantee the free movement of 
goods and services, while permitting states to retain their traditional forms of 
regulation. Minimum harmonisation is where all governments agree to a specific set 
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of minimum standards in regulations, but individual states are able to set higher 
standards individually (Majone 1998: 313). This case has also been referred to as the 
‘race to the bottom’ in Europe as governments resort to the lowest common 
denominator in order to gain agreement of all parties (Leebron 1997).  
The best known example in Australia of harmonisation is the Building Code of 
Australia which seeks to set a minimum standard of performance for buildings and 
building materials across Australia. This is not the only option, with the range of 
possible options outlined below. This range of options is useful to consider when 
contemplating how to achieve increased coordination in specific areas between 
governments.  
Cooperative agreements are formal arrangements where two or more governments 
agree to work together. Such agreements include contracts, written undertakings, 
agreements on similar policies (Opeskin 2001). Informal arrangements typically take 
place within specific portfolios (eg. Public works) and range from conversations to 
intergovernmental committees (Opeskin 2001). There are a large range of 
intergovernmental committees which seek to develop solutions to share information. 
These arrangements have been referred to as either ‘iron rods’ due to the 
constrained and focussed nature of the interactions, or ‘threads of gossamer’  which 
emerge through intergovernmental relations managers with a wide focus and 
interaction (Chapman 1989: 55). This is similar to notions of policy networks, 
characterised by strong or weak ties between actors (Milward & Provan 1998).  
Difficulties can arise from these intergovernmental committees however, as a state 
parliament is not legal bound by an intergovernmental agreement to enact legislation 
to implement a uniform scheme (Farina 2004). In practical terms, particularly if there 
is a financial grant being given by the Commonwealth, there is often strong incentive 
to pass the bill effectively endorsing the agreement.  
There are a number of ways in which harmonisation can be achieved between 
various jurisdictions in a federated structure. The options listed below range from 
most coordinated to least coordinated.  
Table 1- Mechanisms for Harmonising Regulations in Federal Systems of Government  
O
pt
io
n 
1-
 M
os
t 
co
or
di
na
te
d  Unilateral 
Exercise of 
Power by the 
Commonwealth 
Creating uniformity in regulation in Australia by Commonwealth 
legislating in such a way as to over-ride all similar state and 
territory regulations. For such an approach to work, legitimate 
authority in the constitution, termed a ‘head of power’, needs to be 
determined. As the Commonwealth lacks head of power for OH&S 
this option is difficult to enact, although the Commonwealth can 
attach conditions to funding to the states.  
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O
pt
io
n 
2 Reference of 
Power to the 
Commonwealth 
The states can elect to refer a state power to the Commonwealth 
under the Constitution (Farina 2004). If a ‘matter’ is referred to the 
Commonwealth by a state, the Commonwealth is then able to 
legislate (Allen Consulting Group 2002; Opeskin 2001). The 
Commonwealth government attempted this recently when it 
requested that the states  refer workplace relations powers to the 
Commonwealth. This attempt failed when the “states advised that 
they will not refer their [industrial relations] powers” (COAG 
Communiqué 2005) to the Commonwealth.  Cole (2003) 
suggested this was also unlikely to occur for OH&S regulation.  
O
pt
io
n 
3 Incorporation 
by Reference 
The incorporation by reference application is where the various 
parliaments adopt the legislation of a single jurisdiction as 
amended from time to time in accordance with an 
intergovernmental agreement (Saunders 1994, 8). The advantage 
of this form of coordination is that there is need to only change a 
single piece of legislation, rather than several pieces of legislation 
although it requires extensive consultation (Allen Consulting 
Group 2002, Farina 2004, 41).  The Building Code of Australia 
could be considered an example of this. This option was endorsed 
by Cole (2003) as the most viable for the construction industry.  
O
pt
io
n 
4 Complementary 
or Mirror 
Legislation 
This option requires that the Commonwealth and states work 
together to achieve legislative coverage of a particular policy area 
(Allen Consulting Group 2002), particularly where there are dual, 
overlapping to uncertain division of constitutional powers (Farina 
2004, 41). In these instances, each jurisdiction enacts laws to the 
extent of its constitutional capacity and the matter is addressed by 
the participation of all of the legislatures of the Federation 
(Opeskin 2001). “The Commonwealth and all participating states 
would pass separate, but totally consistent (although not 
necessarily identical) pieces of legislation” (Allen Consulting 
Group 2002, 40). An intergovernmental agreement is normally 
required to set out the terms and conditions of the arrangement.   
O
pt
io
n 
5 
– 
m
od
er
at
el
y 
co
or
di
na
te
d  Mutual 
Recognition 
Under mutual recognition, the rules and regulations of other 
jurisdictions are recognised (Farina 2004). Mutual recognition 
enables goods or services to be traded across jurisdictions, and 
means that if the goods or services comply with the legislation in 
their own jurisdiction, then are deemed to comply with the 
requirements of the second jurisdiction, or pathways for achieving 
compliance are clearly established (Farina 2004). Mutual 
recognition is a one of the vehicles governments can utilise to 
reduce the regulatory impediments to goods and services mobility 
across jurisdictions (Productivity Commission 2003).   
O
pt
io
n 6 Agreed 
Legislation or 
Policies 
This mechanism is where governments in question agree to 
implement similar legislation or policies, which are then 
implemented by local legislation (Allen Consulting Group 2002). 
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O
pt
io
n 7 Adoptive 
Recognition 
A jurisdiction recognises that the decisions of another jurisdiction 
meet the requirements of its own legislation regardless of whether 
this recognition is mutual (Farina 2004).  
O
pt
io
n 
8 Non-Binding 
National 
Standards 
Model 
A national authority makes decisions which are adopted to various 
extents by the respective state or territory ministers (Farina 2004, 
42).  
O
pt
io
n 
9 Exchange of 
Information 
Such an exchange can take many forms, including where 
meetings between Ministers and/or public servants occur on a 
regular basis to exchange information; or where best practice 
guidelines or demonstration projects are published with the 
intention that they will be adopted by other jurisdictions (Allen 
Consulting Group 2002). 
O
pt
io
n 
10
 –
un
co
or
di
na
te
d  Independent 
Unilateralism 
Under this option each jurisdiction goes its own way – so there is 
no coordination at all between governments (Farina 2004, 42). 
Unlike option one, this option means that the states and the 
commonwealth all act in an uncoordinated way and pursue 
disparate policy objectives.  
 
 
This section has focussed on various views of the relationships between federated 
systems of government, and the ways in which these governments can achieve some 
level of consistency or harmonisation of regulations.  
3. UNDERSTANDING PUBLIC POLICY 
Having examined the structure of governments, it is important to examine the actions 
and decisions of government, or making public policy. This aspect is an important 
and often overlooked area when examining government. The first step in examining 
public policy is to define the concept and a several related public policy terms.  
3.1 Definition of public policy 
There are a variety of definitions of public policy. Some definitions attempt to cover 
everything, such as: “policy is everything that governments choose, or choose not, to 
do” (Dye 1998), but may be unhelpful in making the process clear.   
3.1.1 Definitions by government: 
Public policy is an expression of what a government wants to achieve, and involves 
choosing, deciding, implementing and evaluating; it can be substantive – decided by 
parliament or cabinet, or procedural – decided at lower levels and concerning day to 
day action (Department of Premier and Cabinet 2000).  
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3.1.2 Definitions by academics  
 “Public policy is the disposition and deliberate action of government on 
any and every matter over which it exercises authority. This includes the 
stated and unstated; action and inaction; the choice of ends and the 
choice of means. Policies are often implemented by means of specific 
programs – which are formal arrangements for the delivery of government 
services” (Fenna 2004:5). 
“While it might be going too far to say that public policy is the study of 
everything, it is certainly the study of everything that is involved in 
governing. This includes the political process, institutional structures, 
decision making processes, administration and implementation, the 
enormous range of substantive matters that governments must deal with, 
and the philosophical  issues that arise in the process of deciding how to 
deal with those matters” (Fenna 2004: 32) 
3.1.3 Our definitions 
While all of these definitions have their place and pertinent value, it is important to 
distinguish between policy and legislation.  
Public policy is a deliberate action that utilises governmental authority and 
institutions, and typically commits resources (money and services), in order to clarify 
public values and support preferred outcomes for government (adapted from 
Considine 1994:3-4). Policy is about encouraging behaviour – whether through 
legislation, cabinet approved policy, policy by guidelines to achieve consistent 
behaviour of those who follow it. Additionally, policy may include behaviour that does 
not involve the explicit commitment of resources, such as when Cabinet makes a 
decision which is binding on government employees, but is not formalised in 
legislation or regulations. An example of this is the change from delivering all building 
construction in house by government employees to contracting out a large proportion 
of construction activities to the private sector.  
Having determined a policy decision, there are a variety of policy instruments that 
can be used to implement a policy: 
 Policy through advocacy – educating or persuading, using information 
available to the government 
 Policy through money – using spending and taxing powers to shape activity 
beyond government 
 Policy through direct government action – delivering services through public 
agencies 
 Policy through law – legislation, regulation and official authority   
(Hood 1983: 168).  
Legislation is the formal laws passed through parliament that are the result of policy. 
In this sense, legislation is the chosen instrument that governments enact to effect 
policy outcomes.  
Regulation is a rule or directive made and maintained by an authority. Regulations 
are subordinate to legislation, but may clarify how legislation is to be carried out, and 
are also a reflection of policy. While regulation and legislation are just two of the 
possible policy instruments, these mechanisms are the most significant in terms of 
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their reach and impact in influencing the behaviour and activities of groups and 
individuals in the social system and polity (Considine, 1994; Fenna, 2004).  
Programs are formal arrangements for the delivery of government services (Fenna 
2004).  
Having defined public policy, regulation and legislation, it is important to examine a 
number of theoretical models that may assist in understanding how policies are 
developed within government.  
3.2 Policy analysis 
Policy analysis is “an applied social science discipline which uses multiple methods 
of inquiry to produce and transform policy-relevant information that may be utilised in 
political settings to solve policy problems” (Dunn 1981:35). The policy process “may 
best be characterised as an ‘entanglement’. It is argued that “the range of agencies 
and organisations, people and positions involved are enormous” (Chapman 1989: 
54). In order to simplify this complexity, and to make the process understandable, the 
notion of a policy cycle is often referred to.   
A policy cycle attempts to indicate that policy development 
is a process, not an event. “A cycle conveys movement of 
ideas and resources, the iteration of policy making, and a 
routine that does not finish with a decision but carries through 
to implementation and evaluation” (Bridgman & Davis 2004: 
23). The cycle breaks the complexity of policy formation into 
smaller steps, and allows for description of the process. Such 
a model of policy development is not without its problems, as 
the policy cycle can imply a neatness, logic and simplicity 
that is absent from the complex, chaotic and discontinuous 
reality of policy making (Bridgman and Davis 1998). Howard 
argues that:   
“the policy cycle should not be interpreted as a general 
formula that neatly and reliably explains the progress of 
policy processes. While the sequence of policy activities may be followed 
in certain situations, there are also cases where a strict interpretation of 
the model produces a misleading picture of the policy process. The formal 
model is least likely to apply where there is insufficient time to devote to 
proper analysis, where governments are already committed to a course of 
action and in cases where decision makers are unwilling to reveal their 
real objectives” (2005:12).  
Figure 5 - The Australian Policy
Cycle (Bridgman & Davis 2004:
26)
We would concur with Hill and Hupe (2003) who argue that while the policy cycle 
does not reflect reality, it nevertheless provides a powerful analytical tool for 
structuring the analysis of policy processes.  
Bridgman and Davis (2004) have provided the seminal work on policy cycles for 
Australian public service. Consequently, the following sections (3.2.1 to 3.2.7) draw 
heavily on their text, and set out an extended précis of their work.  
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3.2.1 Identifying Policy Issues 
Issues are contested in political life with a variety of groups pressing for the adoption 
of particular viewpoint (Ryan, Parker, Brown, 2003). The ‘policy agenda’ is the result 
of the narrowing of a countless number of possible problems to a select few that 
capture government interest and intent. With limited time and resources, policy 
makers can only pay attention to just so many issues.  
There are a variety of drivers for issues in policy development. Within government, 
these include party political platforms, key government achievements of the past, 
ministerial and governmental changes, the monitoring activities of policy specialists, 
‘sunset’ dates to legislation, or unfavourable audit reports. External drivers for policy 
include economic forces, media attention, opinion polls, international relations, 
technological development, and demographic shifts (Bridgman & Davis 2004).   
For an issue to make the policy agenda and be taken up by government, there needs 
to be agreement on the problem as being significant; there should be prospect of a 
solution; the issue should be one that the government of the day considers of 
sufficient import to invest time and capital; and finally the ideological framework of the 
government may influence whether the issue is addressed at all (Bridgman and Davis 
2004: 41).  
3.2.2 Policy Analysis  
Bridgman and Davis (2004) argue that there are a series of fundamental steps to 
analysing existing policies:  
 
Figure 6: Policy analysis (Bridgman & Davis 2004: 50) 
 
When examining public policy it is possible to focus on the process by which policy is 
developed, the substance of the policy, or the implementation of the policy (Fenna 
2004). Having formulated a problem, the defining of goals is essential to policy 
decision process. Often there are competing goals in government and these should 
be balanced when determining a policy outcome. There are likely to be a variety of 
parameters on the decision process, of which time and money are key aspects. 
However some issues defy easy categorisation, identification of causes or inability to 
cost the courses of action available – and form what have been termed ‘wicked 
issues’ (Bridgman & Davis 2004). The search for alternatives involves research, from 
existing policies at a local and international level, reviews and reports on the issue, 
academic journals, discussions with experts within and outside of government and 
consultation with clients. The purpose of the search is to identify options, from which 
potential solutions for the issue can be identified. When making recommendations on 
various policy options, the economic, social, environmental, legal and political 
contexts need to be considered. 
Page 17 
Impact of a given policy option can be undertaken in economic terms through cost-
benefit analysis, cost-effective analysis or opportunity cost analysis. Typically, the 
policy will often be reviewed in terms of National Competition Policy, competitive 
neutrality, regulatory impact, reduced outlays, and competitive service delivery 
(Bridgman and Davis 2004). Analysis from a social framework often use principles of 
social justice as part of the analysis process, including: rights and obligations, equity, 
participation and access; environmental analysis typically considers issues such as 
biodiversity, ecological sustainability, habitat preservation, environmental quality and 
natural resource management; analysis from a legal perspective considers questions 
of the relation to the constitution, accountability arrangements, human rights and 
liberties, and the legal and administrative efficacy of the proposal (Bridgman and 
Davis 2004).  
Policy researchers will be implementing a normative approach to policy analysis, as 
we will be advocating a specific course of action in relation to specific areas of policy 
(Dunn 1981: 37).  
While there are a number of aspects to the policy analysis process, this project will 
focus on the relationships between policy problems, policy alternatives and 
recommending policy actions, as suggested by Dunn (1981: 48). Monitoring of policy 
outcomes and performance would be beyond the scope of the project.  
3.2.3 Policy instruments  
Having determined a policy decision, there are a variety of policy instruments that 
can be used to implement a policy. These include: 
 Advocacy – where information available to government is used for educating 
or persuading  
 Money – where government attempts to guide activity beyond government 
through its spending and taxing powers  
 Direct action – where government delivers services through agencies 
 Law – where government enacts legislation, regulation and other instruments 
of official authority   
(Hood 1983: 168).  
The choice of policy instrument is important as it links objectives and their attainment. 
Key questions here revolve around the appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, 
equity and workability of the instrument to achieve the policy outcome (Bridgman and 
Davis 2004).  
3.2.4 Consultation  
Consultation is used by governments in order to support democratic values, building 
consensus and political support, improving regulatory quality through information 
collection, reducing regulatory costs on enterprises, citizens and administrations, 
quickening responsiveness, and carrying out strategic agendas (OECD 1994: 6-9). A 
range of consultation processes are possible, from information through to complete 
cooperation.  
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    Minimum participation                                                                    Maximum participation 
   
Information           Consultation                Partnership                 Delegation              Control 
 
Figure 7: Consultation Continuum (Shand & Arnberg 1996: 21) 
 
The Office of the Cabinet (1993: 30) (cited in Department of Premier and Cabinet 
2000) identified a number of key elements of an effective consultation process: 
 Consultation is an essential component of the policy making process; 
 Effective consultation should occur early and throughout the policy process; 
 Each consultation needs to be designed to meet the unique demands of the 
situation and identify and define clearly the issues considered, and allow 
adequate time to conduct the consultation; 
 Effective consultation requires openness about why people are consulted, how 
they will be consulted, and how much influence stakeholders will have in the 
policy decision;  
 Those consulted need to be provided with comprehensive, balanced and 
accurate information; 
 All interested parties should have access to the consultation process; and 
 All participants should be treated with dignity and respect.  
 
Information involves the use of surveys and public information campaigns. 
Consultation involves interest group meetings, circulations of proposals, and public 
hearings. Partnership involves advisory committees, and peak agencies. 
Delegation involves an external body, typically a commission or inquiry. Transfer of 
control, or delegation, is rare for a policy decision, but occurs in the example of 
referendums for example. This links up with stakeholder theory as who is consulted 
can make a difference to the outcome. 
3.2.5 Coordination & Decision  
Coordination is necessary in government to ensure there is an internal congruity of 
policies and decisions through the various agencies of government. Modern 
governments are, in reality, networks of loosely linked organisations, rather than a 
single hierarchy amenable to command and control (Painter 1987:9 cited in Bridgman 
& Davis 2004: 94). This means that there may be potential conflict over policy goals, 
and the costs and benefits of a consistent framework need to be argued coherently.  
Ideally a government will have a well developed and widely distributed policy 
framework, setting out economic, social and environmental objectives. In reality, the 
articulation of such overall policy documents is rarely documented and may be 
scattered amongst budgets, electoral promises, white papers and recent legislation. 
Overall policy objectives must often be inferred and tested through consultation and 
coordination (Bridgman & Davis 2004: 95). Central policy units in government attempt 
to bring a ‘whole of government’ perspective to much policy development. At a 
commonwealth level, this is often done by the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, at a state level with the Department of Premier and Cabinet or the Chief 
Minister, and at a local level around the Office of the Mayor. Typically Treasury and 
the Department of the Attorney-General also have significant roles to play. 
The situation becomes much more complex when applied to intergovernmental 
arrangements. The major reasons for this are that each state of Australia has a 
history and identity of its own, with its own legislature and governments. Difficulties 
can arise where an issue requires cooperation between the states and 
commonwealth, where the central Commonwealth government has limited or no 
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constitutional power (Farina 2004: 9). In federal style governments, there can be a 
trap in which regional and local spheres of government can subvert national 
consistency by effectively exercising a policy veto, resulting in sub-optimal outcomes 
for all players (Scharpf 1988). This has also been referred to as the ‘race to the 
bottom’ in Europe as governments resort to the lowest common denominator in order 
to gain agreement of all parties (Leebron 1997).  
 
3.2.6 Implementation 
Implementation can sometimes fail because the agencies lack expertise or 
commitment, implementation mechanisms are too rigid, people do not respond as the 
government expects, the cost of realising the policy objective becomes prohibitive, 
the program assumes cooperation between government departments that does not 
occur or powers that are beyond the governments control, there are too few 
incentives to encourage compliance, or those implementing the program do not 
understand what is required (Patton & Sawick 1993: 365). Bridgeman and Davis 
(2004) suggest that incomplete specification, inappropriate agency, conflicting 
objectives and directives, failure of incentives, limited competency, inadequate 
resources, and communication failures summarise the way in which implementation 
can fail.  
3.2.7 Evaluation  
 
Figure 8: Policy Evaluation (Department of Finance 1994:8) 
The policy cycle begins and ends with evaluation (Bridgeman and Davis 2004: 130) 
 The resources and materials used to deliver policy are called inputs   
 The products that emerge, or are produce, from the organisation are called 
outputs  
 Outcomes are the results of policy for the clients and others (Kettner & Martin 
1987).  
 
An example, is the local government employees who carry out inspections of 
buildings. The inputs are the time and effort of government employees, and the policy 
framework which frames this inspection regime. Outputs are the number of houses 
inspected. The outcomes are a high quality of construction activity.  
 
Efficiency can be achieved by reducing the number of inputs for the same number of 
outputs. Effectiveness can be increased by ensuring outcomes achieve the stated 
objectives. Appropriateness is increased if the objectives are consistent with 
government priorities and these priorities are consistent with community needs 
(Crossfield & Burn 1994: 4).  
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Appropriateness, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness and efficiency are all capable of 
being the focus of a policy evaluation process (Department of Finance 1994).  
3.3 Public policy and innovation in the construction industry 
Innovation in the construction industry can take many forms. Innovation can be 
classified “according to whether it is ‘incremental’ (small, and based on existing 
experience and knowledge), ‘radical’ (a breakthrough in science or technology), 
‘modular’ (a change in concept within a component only), ‘architectural’ (a change in 
links to other components or systems), or ‘system’ (multiple, integrated innovations)” 
(Slaughter 1988, cited in Blayse and Manley 2004, p.144).  
The OECD found that innovation can either be ‘technical’ or ‘organisational’. 
Technical innovation involves either ‘product’ or ‘process’ innovation, whereas 
organisational innovation can include elements such as establishment of changed 
organisational structure, introduction of advanced management techniques, and 
implementation of new corporate strategic orientations (Blayse and Manley 2004, p. 
144).  
By applying 
these notions 
to public policy 
a typology of 
innovations 
can be 
asserted:  
  New   
  Expansionary Total 
  Innovation Innovation 
New Existing    
 ‘x’
Existing   
Developmental  
Change 
Evolutionary 
Innovation 
  axis – the servicesthat a Public Service 
Organisation provides  
 ‘y’  axis – the needs that a Public service 
Organisation  is 
addressing 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 (Osborne & Brown 2005: 151) 
In the public sphere, successful innovations are perceived to have a number of key 
attributes: 
 Relative advantage over what preceded it; 
 Compatibility with existing technologies / skills; 
 Ease of comprehension by end users; 
 Trialability; and, 
 The observability of its results and achievements (Osborne & Brown 2005:127).  
 
As this project is attempting innovation in a number of policy areas, the 
recommendations of Osborne and Brown (2005) appear pertinent. Any policy 
innovations we propose need to improve on the current situation; be compatible with 
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existing technologies; be easily understood by users; be capable of being trialled; 
and have results that can be measured in some way.  
3.4 Specific areas of policy that could be enhanced through 
increased harmonisation  
The CRC CI, through the Construction Industry Business Environment project will 
undertake research on the appropriate mechanisms to achieve increased 
harmonisation in a number of key areas:  
 Occupational Health and Safety 
 Sustainable built environment  
 Training and capability 
 eBusiness (eGovernment)  
 Procurement (PPP, privatisation, contracting out) 
 Builders Licensing 
CONCLUSION  
This report has provided an overview of public policy as it affects the construction 
industry in Australia. Initially the federal system of government was outlined and the 
mechanisms by which coordination of regulation could occur were examined. This 
discussion then led to a broader discussion of policy development, in particular the 
policy cycle advocated by Bridgeman and Davis (2004).  
The coordination of policy in federal systems of government is a difficult task. The 
complexity of intergovernmental relationships in federal systems of government leads 
to competition. This competition is not just between different spheres of government 
for resources in order to effectively govern, but also between different perspectives 
on how governments do, or should, relate to each other. Even once a way of relating 
can be agreed upon, there are significant challenges in order to achieve coordination 
in the first place, not least of which is to identify the most appropriate method of 
achieving coordination. These tools range from unilateral exercise of power by the 
commonwealth to a ‘free for all’ system in which each jurisdiction legislates as it sees 
fit.    
There is a strongly held belief in industry that that government regulation inhibits 
innovation (Manley 2004). However, other researchers have shown that it is possible 
for government regulation to foster innovation (Borins 2001; Gann, Wang & Hawkins 
1998; Rothwell & Zegveld 1981, Taylor, Rubin & Hounshell 2005). Further research 
is needed on the relationship between government regulation and innovation in 
Australia, particularly the situations and circumstances under which regulation can 
act as an enabler of innovation, and those circumstances in which it acts as an 
inhibiter. Further research is also needed on the specific nature of the ways in which 
harmonisation or co-ordinative effort can be used most effectively for achieving 
regulatory and policy coherence of the construction industry in Australia.  
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5. GLOSSARY 
 
 
Public policy is a deliberate action that utilises governmental authority and institutions, and commits 
resources (money and services), in order to clarify public values and support preferred outcomes for 
government (after Considine 1994:3-4).  
Legislation is the formal laws passed through parliament that are the result of policy. In this sense, 
legislation is the chosen instrument to enact policy for government.  
Regulation is a rule or directive made and maintained by an authority. Regulations are subordinate to 
legislation, but may clarify how legislation is to be carried out.  
A client in this context therefore, is one of the multiple stakeholders that can affect, or be affected by, 
public polic 
